16. REOPENING/RECONVENING16. REOPENING / RECONVENING
16.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the very limited circumstances in which the Refugee Division is entitled, as a result of an application by a party or its own initiative, to reopen and change its earlier final decision on a claim or Minister's application. (Different criteria apply when the when the Federal Court sets aside a decision of the Refugee Division and orders that the matter be reconsidered or reheard.)
This chapter also deals with the situation where, at the request of a party or at the panel's own initiative, the panel
reconvenes a hearing before it has rendered a final decision in the matter or receives additional evidence.
For a discussion of the "reinstatement" of a claim that has been "withdrawn", please see chapter 14,
Withdrawal and Reinstatement.
The
Immigration Act provides that the Minister, with leave of the Chairperson, may make an application to the Refugee Division to reconsider and vacate any determination under the Act or the Regulations that a person is a Convention refugee, on the ground that the determination was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation [
Immigration Act, s. 69.2(2);
CRDD Rule 7]. The Minister may also bring a cessation application [
Immigration Act, s. 69.2(1);
CRDD Rule 7].
Apart from those provisions, there is no explicit authority in the Act for the Refugee Division to reconsider one of its final decisions. Nevertheless, certain common law principles (
i.e., principles established by case law) permit administrative tribunals to reconsider their own decisions under special circumstances, for example, where the tribunal recognizes that it failed to comply with the rules of natural justice in the conduct of its proceedings.
Rule 28 of the
CRDD Rules sets out a general procedure for bringing a motion before the Refugee Division; this is the Rule that a party must use in order to seek a reopening of a hearing. In
Chaudhry, Fahimuddin v.
M.E.I. (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-2528-93), Nadon, July 15, 1994; reported:
Chaudhry v. Canada (
Minister of Employment and Immigration)(1994), 25
Imm. L.R. (2d) 139 (
F.C.T.D.), the Trial Division clarified that the
CRDD rule on reopening did not give a substantive right to reopen, but rather sets out a procedure to be followed when an application for reopening is made.
16.2 REOPENING BY THE REFUGEE DIVISION
16.3 Overview
The Supreme Court of Canada stated in
Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 848 at 861:
… As a general rule, once such a tribunal has reached a final decision in respect to the matter that is before it in accordance with its enabling statute, that decision cannot be revisited because the tribunal has changed its mind, made an error within jurisdiction or because there has been a change of circumstances. It can only do so if authorized by statute or if there has been a slip or error within the exceptions enunciated in
Paper Machinery Ltd. v. J.O. Ross Engineering Corp., supra.
This general rule is also known as the principle of
functus officio. The two exceptions, enunciated in
Paper Machinery Ltd. v. J.O. Ross Engineering Corp, [1934]
S.C.R. 186, to the general rule that a final decision of a court cannot be reopened, are:
- where there has been a slip in drawing it up, and,
- where there was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the Court.
The Refugee Division was created by a statute, namely, the
Immigration Act, and the Refugee Division has only the powers given to it by the Act. The Act does not include a provision expressly permitting the Refugee Division to reopen a hearing or to "rehear" a case. Therefore, it must be assumed that Parliament did not intend for the Refugee Division to have a general authority to reopen a concluded hearing, except in the limited circumstances set out in section 69.2 of the Act. That section permits the Minister to make an application to the Refugee Division for a determination of cessation of refugee status or for reconsideration and vacation of a previous determination of refugee status.
In the absence of express statutory authority, a tribunal cannot set aside its own decisions [see
Lugano v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1977] 2
F.C. 605 (
C.A.)]. The Refugee Division, therefore, has no general power to reopen a hearing for additional evidence or testimony whenever it wishes to do so. The Refugee Division may reopen a hearing in limited circumstances, for example, where it recognizes that there was a denial of natural justice in the conduct of its proceedings. This common law (case law) authority is discussed below.
16.2.2 Reopening Solely for Additional Evidence
After the Refugee Division has rendered a decision, a claimant might request the Refugee Division to reopen the hearing, on the basis that the claimant has: (1) additional evidence which existed at the time of the hearing, but not presented at the hearing; or (2) new evidence which arose after the hearing. The Refugee Division should normally refuse to reopen in both situations, on the basis that it has no jurisdiction to do so.
Although there are a number of procedural differences, a Refugee Division hearing into a claim is substantially the same in concept as a redetermination of a claim by the previous Immigration Appeal Board (
IAB). In
Longia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3
F.C. 288 (
C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal held that the
IAB had been correct in deciding that it had no jurisdiction to reopen an application for redetermination of a claim which it had already disposed of solely in order to hear evidence of new facts. The claimant sought to introduce evidence that he had in fact been a member of the International Sikh Youth Federation prior to the redetermination hearing and also that he had information that warrants for his arrest had been issued after the hearing. The Federal Court ruled that the determination of Convention refugee status is "wholly adjudicative", not "equitable, administrative or political," and therefore the
IAB had "no inherent or continuing jurisdiction to reopen a redetermination hearing of an application for refugee status." The Supreme Court of Canada in
Grillas v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1972]
S.C.R. 577 had ruled that the
IAB did have a continuing jurisdiction with respect to appeals made on "humanitarian" grounds, that is, the Board had the power to reopen from time to time to exercise that jurisdiction. The Federal Court, in
Longia, however, said that was a different situation from refugee determination.
The Federal Court acknowledged that circumstances could change after the hearing, but indicated that it would be up to the Executive branch of Government (the Minister) to grant a remedy, not for the Board to grant a new hearing. The well-founded fear of persecution alleged by the claimant has to be ascertained at the moment the claim is adjudicated. In its analysis in
Longia, the Court specifically referred to the current eligibility provisions in the Act, which prohibit the claimant from filing a new claim unless the claimant leaves Canada for 90 days [
Immigration Act, s. 46.01(1)(c)].
The Trial Division has applied the reasoning in
Longia to hearings in the Refugee Division; see for example:
- Agbona, Charles v.
M.E.I. (
F.C.A.,
no. IMM-3698-93), Noel, July 22, 1993. Reported:
Agbona v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 21
Imm. L.R. (2d) 279 (
F.C.T.D.)
- Camacho-Souza, Ricardo v.
M.E.I. (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-406-93), Wetston, February 28, 1994
- Chaudhry, Fahimuddin v.
M.E.I. (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-2528-93),
Nadon, July 15, 1994. Reported:
Chaudhry v. Canada (
Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 25
Imm. L.R. (2d) 139 (
F.C.T.D.)
- Iqbal, Muhammad v.
M.C.I. (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-4207-93), Muldoon, May 7, 1996; Reported:
Iqbal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33
Imm. L.R. (2d) 179 (
F.C.T.D.)
16.2.3 Reopening Where Denial of Natural Justice
Where a tribunal recognizes that it has failed to observe the rules of natural justice, it may treat its decision as a nullity and rehear the case [
Woldu v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1978] 2
F.C. 216 (
C.A.) at 219, as quoted in
Gill v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] 2
F.C. 425 (
C.A.)].
In
Gill (above), the claimant had had an application for redetermination dismissed by the
IAB in 1984, without an oral hearing. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1
S.C.R. 177, holding that all claimants were entitled to an oral hearing. The claimant then asked the Federal Court for an extension of time for leave to file an application for judicial review of the
IAB's 1984 decision. The Federal Court refused that application. The claimant then applied to the
IAB for a reopening of its 1984 decision. The
IAB refused to reopen because it considered itself bound by the Federal Court's decision. The claimant went back to Federal Court, which stated in
Gill [at pages 427-28]:
We are all agreed that the Board majority was entirely mistaken in drawing the conclusion that this Court's decision on an application for an extension of time could be taken simply as a decision on the merits of an application for redetermination. Nor could it bind the Board, which has its own statutory jurisdiction.
In our view, therefore, the Board fettered its discretion in considering itself so bound, if this was otherwise a matter on which the Board possessed a discretion.
The Federal Court also stated [at page 428]:
In deciding that the Board lacked jurisdiction under the predecessor
Immigration Appeal Board Act [
R.S.C. 1970, c.I-3 (rep. by
S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, s. 128)] to grant a motion for reopening an appeal, this Court held in
Lugano v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1977] 2
F.C. 605 (
C.A.) that the Board had neither explicit nor implicit statutory authority to do so. Jackett C.J. said for the Court at page 608:
Once an appeal has been terminated by a section 11(3) decision, I am of opinion that it remains terminated until the decision terminating it is set aside; and in the absence of express statutory authority a tribunal cannot set aside its own decisions. [Subsection 11(3) of the
Immigration Appeal Board Act is the predecessor provisions of subsection 71(1) of the
Immigration Act, 1976.]
However, in
Woldu v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1978] 2
F.C. 216 (
C.A.) decided October 27, 1977, another case under the previous Act, Le Dain J. who had concurred in the
Lugano decision, suggested this significant qualification, at page 219:
Notwithstanding the general principle, affirmed in the
Lugano case, that an administrative tribunal does not have the power, in the absence of express statutory authority, to set aside its decision, there is judicial opinion to suggest that where a tribunal recognizes that it has failed to observe the rules of natural justice it may treat its decision as a nullity and rehear the case.
Therefore, the Refugee Division has the authority to reopen a hearing where it recognizes that it made an error of law, such as a denial of natural justice. For example, if the Refugee Division becomes satisfied that the interpreter made substantial mistakes during the hearing, the Refugee Division might find that the claimant did not have a proper "opportunity to be heard" and, as a result, the Division may grant a new hearing.
The types of errors in this regard go to procedure, not substance. For example, if the panel decides that it did not apply the correct interpretation of "particular social group", it cannot reopen to correct this mistake. The claimant has the right to seek leave to commence an application for judicial review in the Federal Court to correct this type of error [
Immigration Act, s. 82.1(1)].
Furthermore, in accordance with
Longia, the Refugee Division does not have the authority to reopen solely to receive evidence of events which occurred after the decision was made. But in
Longia, the Federal Court of Appeal did refer to and approve of
Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2
F.C. 209 (
C.A.)
In
Kaur, the person concerned had not made a refugee claim at an inquiry because of threats and duress by her husband. In
Longia (at page 294), the
Kaur decision was held to stand for the proposition:
… that an immigration inquiry, held at a moment when the person concerned was under the direct influence of a third party (her husband) and not free to bring up facts as they were, could be seen as having breached the rules of natural justice, with the result that the decision that followed was a nullity under the Charter and the adjudicator could reconsider his decision.
This decision of the Federal Court of Appeal is in keeping with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 848. The Court found that a tribunal can reopen where its decision can be seen as a nullity due to a breach of natural justice. In
Chandler, Sopinka J. stated for the majority, at 862:
… Traditionally, a tribunal, which makes a determination which is a nullity, has been permitted to reconsider the matter afresh and render a valid decision.
The tribunal in
Chandler reopened on its own motion. The Supreme Court did not comment on this aspect of the case. It is generally recommended that the Refugee Division be cautious in using such an extraordinary remedy after a final decision has been rendered.
16.3 RECONVENING A HEARING
The proceedings are not completed until a decision has been rendered. Until that time, a panel has the authority to reconvene the hearing or to receive further evidence, as it sees fit and as "fairness" dictates. This situation is not strictly a "reopening" or a "rehearing", but rather it is merely a continuation of the original hearing and no special legislative authority is necessary for the hearing to reconvene.
Claimants should not expect automatically to be able to file additional evidence on an ongoing basis after every hearing and thus drag out the hearing process. On the other hand, the Refugee Division should not refuse to receive evidence solely on the basis that the oral hearing was held and a decision is pending. The Refugee Division must consider efficiency, but fairness is the paramount concern [
Immigration Act, s. 68(2)].
In
Okantah, Nii Aryee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-2091-95), Rothstein, March 26, 1996, the claimant tendered letters and further submissions, after the Refugee Division hearing had concluded. The panel refused to receive this material because it did not relate to a central issue in the case. In dismissing the application for judicial review, the Court stated:
While a tribunal must receive evidence and hear submissions that are relevant during the course of a hearing, where the application is to reopen, I do not think a tribunal errs if it refuses to receive such information if it has concluded that the information will not affect its decision.
Another situation is where the evidence that the claimant wants to submit was readily obtainable for the oral hearing, and the claimant has no satisfactory explanation as to why it was not presented then. The Refugee Division might, in its discretion, decide that the claimant had had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence [
Immigration Act, s. 69.1(5)(a)] and decline to consider the additional evidence.
On the other hand, the panel might, for example, through judicial notice or its specialized knowledge, come across evidence that may affect the outcome of the case [see
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Salinas, Marisol Escobar (
F.C.A.,
no. A-1323-91), Stone, MacGuigan, Henry, June 25, 1992; reported:
Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) v. Salinas (1992), 17
Imm. L.R. (2d) 118 (
F.C.A.)]. There may have been a change of government in the country of alleged persecution. Depending on the nature of the evidence, the panel might have that information sent to the claimant and counsel with a request for comments by a certain date. The panel could indicate its willingness to reconvene at the request of the claimant. In other cases, it may be appropriate to notify the parties that the panel wishes to reconvene and provide notice of the reasons.
16.4 WHERE PROCEEDINGS ARE PENDING IN FEDERAL COURT
Following an unfavourable decision by the Refugee Division, a claimant may seek a remedy in the Federal Court by way of an application for judicial review [
Immigration Act, s. 82.2]. While awaiting the outcome of the application, the claimant might apply to the Refugee Division for a reopening. In these circumstances, the Refugee Division should ordinarily decline to consider the application on the basis that the matter is awaiting resolution in the courts.
Where a matter has been disposed of by the Federal Court, the result is not so clear. In
Gill (above) the Federal Court of Appeal indicated that the refusal of an extension of time to file an application for judicial review should not be taken as a decision of the merits of the case and the Board still had the jurisdiction decide whether to reopen. Similarly, the Court could dismiss a leave application or the application itself because of technical defects in the documents filed or because the documents were otherwise poorly prepared. Unless the Court directly addresses a particular issue, the Refugee Division retains jurisdiction to address that issue and, where appropriate, to reopen a hearing to correct an error.
In
Shaju, Mohammed v.
M.C.I. (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-3725-94), Nadon, June 21, 1995, the Refugee Division found the claimant not credible and dismissed his claim. The Trial Division dismissed his application for leave for judicial review. The claimant then brought a motion before the Refugee Division to reopen his claim on the grounds that there had been a lack of proper translation. The Refugee Division dismissed the motion on the grounds that the translation errors were not significant and that, in any event, that issue had been dealt with in the leave application. The claimant then brought an application for leave for judicial review of the decision dismissing the motion to reopen. The Trial Division dismissed the application for leave. The only point raised in the original leave application was the lack of proper translation, and the court had refused leave after considering the claimant's argument's. That decision therefore gave rise to "issue
estoppel",
i.e., it was decided matter (
res judicata), and could not be appealed.
Appendix 16A -
CRDD Rule 28
Motions
28. (1) Every application that is not provided for in these Rules shall be made by a party to the Refugee Division by motion, unless, where the application is made during a hearing, the members decide that, in the interests of justice, the application should be dealt with in some other manner.
(2) The motion shall consist of
(
a) a notice specifying the grounds on which the motion is made;
(
b) an affidavit setting out the facts on which the motion is based; and
(
c) a concise statement of the law and of the arguments that are relied on by the applicant.
(3) The motion shall be
(
a) served on the other party to the proceeding; and
(
b) filed in duplicate, together with proof of service thereof, at the registry within five days after the date of service.
(4) Evidence in support of a motion shall be introduced by affidavit, unless the Refugee Division decides that, in the interests of justice, the evidence should be introduced in some other manner.
(5) The other party may, within seven days after being served with a motion, file at the registry a reply stating concisely the law and arguments relied on by the party, accompanied by an affidavit setting out the facts on which the reply is based.
(6) A refugee hearing officer may, within seven days after the day on which the motion was filed, file at the registry a summary of the matters that the refugee hearing officer believes that the Refugee Division should take into consideration when deciding on the motion.
(7) The applicant may, within seven days after being served with a reply referred to in subrule (5) or a summary referred to in subrule (6), file a response thereto at the registry.
(8) A copy of the reply and affidavit filed pursuant to subrule (5), of the summary filed pursuant to subrule (6) and of the response filed pursuant to subrule (7) shall be served on every party within seven days after the date of service of the motion, reply or summary, as the case may be.
(9) The Refugee Division, on being satisfied that no injustice is likely to be caused, may dispose of a motion without a hearing.
Appendix 16B - Selected Case Law
- Agbona, Charles v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (
F.C.A.,
no. IMM-3698-93), Noel, July 22, 1993. Reported:
Agbona v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 21 Imm L.R. (2d) 279 (
F.C.T.D.) (Once the
CRDD has decided a claim, it lacks jurisdiction to reopen for new facts.
Longia still governs, despite the 1993 amendments to the Act by Bill C-86.)
- Camacho-Souza, Ricardo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-406-93), Wetston, February 28, 1994 (
CRDD rejected the claim. Federal Court denied leave. Claimant applied to
CRDD for rehearing under
CRDD Rule 30 [now
CRDD Rule 28], based on new evidence and on post-traumatic stress which denied him a fair hearing.
CRDD refused to rehear the claim. Court applied
Chandler and
Longia, and found no error by the
CRDD in refusing to reopen.)
- Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Nabiye, [1989] 3
F.C. 424 (
C.A.) (
IAB had no jurisdiction to reopen an application for determination where the only ground for reconsideration was to receive evidence of new facts)
- Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 848 (as a general rule, once an administrative tribunal has reached a final decision in respect of a matter that is before it in accordance with its enabling statute, that decision cannot be revisited because the tribunal has changed its mind, made an error within jurisdiction or because there has been a change of circumstances; it can only do so if authorized by statute or if there has been a slip in drawing up the decision or there has been an error in expressing the manifest intention of the tribunal; here the board failed to dispose of the matter before it in a manner permitted by the Act; while the board intended to make a final disposition on the matter before it, that disposition was a nullity and amounted in law to no disposition at all; in these circumstances, the board should be entitled to continue the original proceedings to consider disposition of the matter on a proper basis.)
- Chaudhry, Fahimuddin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-2528-93), Nadon, July 15, 1994. Reported:
Chaudhry v. Canada (
Minister of Employment and Immigration)(1994), 25
Imm. L.R. (2d) 139 (
F.C.T.D.) (Trial Division considered itself bound by the Court of Appeal decisions in
Nabiye,
Singh and
Longia and applied the doctrine of
functus officio to the negative
CRDD decision.
Chandler considered.
CRDD Rules did not give a substantive right to reopen, but rather set out a procedure to be followed)
- Gill v. Canada (Minister of Employment Immigration), [1987] 2
F.C. 425 (
C.A.) (tribunal has jurisdiction to reconsider an earlier decision where it recognizes it breached rules of natural justice)
- Grillas v. Canada (Minister of Employment Immigration), [1972]
S.C.R. 577 (
IAB could reopen an appeal against a deportation order, without express statutory authority, because its "humanitarian" jurisdiction was ongoing)
- Iqbal, Muhammad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-4207-93), Muldoon, May 7, 1996. Reported:
Iqbal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33
Imm. L.R. (2d) 179 (
F.C.T.D.) (Claimant had sent home for crucial documentation. Its availability was discussed at the hearing.
CRDD rendered its negative decision.
CRDD refused to reopen to receive the document, which was received after the hearing. In the Court's view, fundamental justice requires a tribunal to delay its decision if it knows that, given a reasonable time, applicant can obtain a crucial document. However, no evidence at the hearing established that the document was on its way. Counsel failed to ask for an adjournment. Reopening is barred by s. 46.01(1)(c)(i) of the Act. The
Charter does not confer reopening jurisdiction which is otherwise lacking.
CRDD's lack of jurisdiction does not offend
Charter, s. 7, though it might violate
Bill of Rights, s. 2(e))
- Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2
F.C. 209 (
C.A.) (An immigration inquiry, held at a moment when the person concerned was under the direct influence of a third party (her husband) and not free to bring up facts as they were, could be seen as having breached the rules of natural justice, with the result that the decision that followed was a nullity under the
Charter and the adjudicator could reconsider his decision)
- Longia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3
F.C. 288 (
C.A.), (
IAB did not have jurisdiction to reopen an application for redetermination of a claim solely for additional evidence. The power to reopen a hearing to consider evidence which the claimant failed to adduce hinges on whether the hearing was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The well-founded fear of persecution has to be ascertained at the moment the claim is adjudicated and the remedy may have to be provided by the Executive branch of government.)
- Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Salinas, Marisol Escobar (
F.C.A.,
no. A-1323-91), Stone, MacGuigan, Henry, June 25, 1992. Reported:
Canada (Minster of Employment and Immigration) v. Salinas, (1992), 17
Imm. L.R. (2d) 118 (
F.C.A.) (
CRDD is not
functus officio until such time as it makes a determination. Before that, it can exercise the powers conferred on it by statute. It can properly consider evidence of change of circumstances where it gives the claimant the opportunity to be heard at the reconvened hearing.)
- Ojie, Mabel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-3119-97), Pinard, June 19, 1998. (
CRDD did not err in dismissing an application to reopen. The member considered the new evidence and "concluded that nothing in the three experts' reports indicated that [the claimant] was unfit to testify at the initial hearing or that she showed signs of post-traumatic stress syndrome…" He also noted that the claimant had not been so poorly represented by her first counsel so as to conclude that there had been a violation of natural justice.)
- Shaju, Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-3725-94), Nadon, June 21, 1995 (
CRDD dismissed the claim. Trial Division dismissed the application for leave. Claimant then brought a motion before the
CRDD to reopen his claim on the grounds that there had been a lack of proper translation.
CRDD dismissed the motion: the translation errors were not significant and that issue had been dealt with in the leave application. Claimant then brought an application for leave for judicial review of that decision. Court dismissed the application for leave. Since the only point raised in the original leave application was the lack of proper translation and the court had refused leave after considering the claimant's argument's, that decision gave rise to "issue estoppel". It was a final decision on which could not be appealed.)
- Singh, Sarwan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (
F.C.A.,
no. A-810-87), Mahoney, Marceau, Hugessen, August 2, 1988. Reported:
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 6
Imm. L.R. (2d) 10 (
F.C.A.) (
IAB had no jurisdiction to reopen an application for determination where the only ground for reconsideration was to receive evidence of new facts)
- Okantah, Nii Aryee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (
F.C.T.D.,
no. IMM-2091-95), Rothstein, March 26, 1996. (After the hearing had concluded, the claimant tendered letters and further submissions. The panel refused to receive this material. The Court was not satisfied that the information related in any direct way to the issue of state protection. While a tribunal must receive evidence and hear submissions that are relevant during the course of a hearing, where the application is to reopen the tribunal may refuse to receive such information if it has concluded that the information will not affect its decision. The Court inferred from the reasons for the refusal that the panel had decided the matter after the hearing, and had concluded the additional matter was not relevant to its decision. Application dismissed.)